Process Safety Video - The Deepwater Horizon Disaster


 Process Safety Video - The Deepwater Horizon Disaster

Process Safety Video - Deepwater Horizon In Their Own Words by National Geographic


 Process Safety Video - Deepwater Horizon In Their Own Words by National Geographic

National Incident Management System

What is National Incident Management System (NIMS)

National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a comprehensive framework that guides all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector in effectively managing incidents and emergencies (work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from incidents). NIMS was established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide standardized approach to incident management across various sectors and lead by its agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems that guide how personnel work together during incidents.

Key Component of NIMS

  1. Common Terminology: NIMS establishes a common language and framework for all responders which helps to eliminate confusion and improve communication during incidents management.
  2. Incident Command System (ICS): A key component of NIMS, ICS provides a standardized organizational structure for managing incidents, allowing for efficient resources allocation and coordination among multile agencies.
  3. Preparedness and Planning: NIMS emphasizes the importance of preparedness through training, exercises, and planning to ensure that all stakeholders are ready to respond effectively to incidents. 
  4. Resource Management: NIMS includes guidelines for managing resources, including personnel, equipment, and supplies, to ensure that they are available and effectively utilized during emergencies.
  5. Mutual Aid Agreements: NIMS encourages jurisdictions to establish agreements to provide assistance to one another during incidents, enhancing overall response capabilities.

Conclusion

NIMS plays a critical role in emergency management by providing a structured approach to incident management that enhances collabortion and effectiveness accross all levels of government and the provate sector. By adopting NIMS, communities can improve their preparedness and response capabilities and ultimately reducing the impact of emergencies on lives and property.

For more detailed information, you can visit the official FEMA NIMS page.

Reference:

  1. National Incident Management System | FEMA.gov
  2. Emergency Management Institute - National Incident Management System (NIMS)
  3. National Incident Management System

Bhopal Incident

Accident Description

Incident:

  • Bhopal Disaster

Date:

  • 3 December 1984

Location:

  • Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India

Impact:

  • Immediate death were estimated at over 3,000 peolple but long-term estimates suggest 15,000 to 20,000 people may have died due to exposure.
  • Over 500,000 people suffered injuries ranging from respiratory issues to neurological and reproductive disorders.
  • Many survivors continue to suffer from chronic illnesses, and birth defects have been reported in subsequent generations.
How it happened:

  • A massive leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas from a pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). The toxic gas spread over nearby densely populated areas, exposing more than 500,000 people and causing thousands of immediate deaths, with long-term health effects still felt today.

Reference:

Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)

What is Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)?

Hazard and Operability Study also known as HAZOP is a structured and systematic method used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in a process or system. It is normally carried out by a competent and dedicated team. It was one of the method for Process Hazard Analysis (PHA).

HAZOP normally studies and identifies any potential deviations from the design intend, examines their possible causes and assessing the consequences. HAZOP methodology uses guide words as way to systematically assessing the process or system. These guide words are combination of the deviations (No, Less, More, As Well As, Part Of, Reverse, Other Than & etc.) and the parameters (Flow, Tempreature, Pressure, Level & etc.).

As per CCPS definition, a HAZOP is a systematic qualitative technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of guide words to study process deviations. It was used to question every part of a process to discover what deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what their causes and consequences may be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guidewords. This is a systematic detailed review technique, for both batch and continuous plants, which can be applied to new or existing processes to identify hazards.

Why Do We Need HAZOP?

We need to perform HAZOP as part of the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and risk assessment requirements. 

When to Perform HAZOP?

We need to perform HAZOP to examine the deviations from the design requirements and intents.

How to Perform HAZOP?

HAZOP can be performed by the following steps:

  1. Define the Scope & Objectives – Establish the boundaries of the study, including the system or process to be analyzed.
  2. Form the HAZOP Team – Assemble a multidisciplinary team of experts, including engineers, operators, and safety professionals.
  3. Break Down the System into Nodes – Divide the process into manageable sections (nodes) for detailed analysis.
  4. Identify Process Parameters – Examine key variables such as temperature, pressure, flow rate, and chemical composition.
  5. Apply Guide Words – Use predefined keywords like “More,” “Less,” “Reverse,” or “None” to explore potential deviations.
  6. Analyze Causes & Consequences – Determine the root causes of deviations and assess their impact on safety and operations.
  7. Evaluate Safeguards – Identify existing control measures and determine if additional safety mechanisms are needed.
  8. Document Findings & Recommendations – Record observations and propose corrective actions to mitigate risks.
  9. Review & Implement Changes – Ensure that recommended improvements are applied and periodically reassessed.

Main reference for HAZOP:

Process Safety Video - Deepwater Horizon Blowout Animation


Process Safety Video - Deepwater Horizon Blowout Animation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCVCOWejlag

DOSH's Guidance for Preparation and Updating of Report on Industrial Activity (Second Edition)

Since the introduction of Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulation 1996, every employer or occupier of major hazard installations (MHI) have been preparing and periodically review and updating the Report on Industrial Activity as required under the CIMAH Regulations.

The guidance was not intended to be legal document but a practical guide and minimum information to be provided by industries in writing the report. DOSH Director General to emphasized to all owners of major hazards installation (MHI) to continuously use this guidance as a source of reference in preparing Report on Industrial Activity as it was developed to meet the requirements under the Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulation 1996.

Now the guidance was updated to the second edition in 2023 with the purpose of meeting the requirement set forth by the Regulations and expectation of DOSH. The new revision includes the consideration of the current needs and policy, issues arises, comments and recommendations from various parties comproses of DOSH officers, industreies and competent persons.


Link to the DOSH Guidelines website:

Keselamatan Industri (Garis Panduan) - Portal Rasmi Jabatan Keselamatan Dan Kesihatan Pekerjaan


Link to the DOSH Guidelines document:

https://intranet.dosh.gov.my/index.php/competent-person-form/occupational-health/regulation-2-1/guidelines/industrial-safety/3398-guidance-on-preparation-and-updating-of-report-on-industrial-activity-2/file


Macondo Blowout and Explosion

Accident Description

Accident: Macondo Blowout and Explosion

Location: Location: Offshore

Accident Occurred On: 20 April 2010 | Final Report Released On: 20 April 2016

Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion

Investigation Status: The CSB's investigation was unanimously approved by the board.

On April 20, 2010, a sudden explosion and fire occurred on the oil rig. The accident resulted in the deaths of 11 workers and caused a massive, ongoing oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico. The rig was located approximately 50 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana, and had a 126-member crew onboard.



Learn more about the CSB's Macondo Blowout and Explosion investigation here: https://www.csb.gov/macondo-blowout-and-explosion/

BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion Investigation

Accident Description

Accident: BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion

Location: Location: Texas City, TX

Accident Occurred On: 23 March 2005 | Final Report Released On: 20 March 2007

Accident Type: Oil and Refining - Fire and Explosion

Investigation Status: The Board approved its final report by a vote of 5-0 at a public meeting in Texas City on March 20, 2007.

At approximately 1:20 p.m. on March 23, 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas City refinery during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen workers were killed and 180 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or around work trailers located near an atmospheric vent stack. The explosions occurred when a distillation tower flooded with hydrocarbons and was overpressurized, causing a geyser-like release from the vent stack.




Learn more about the CSB's BP Texas City investigation here: https://www.csb.gov/bp-america-texas-city-refinery-explosion/


Process Safety Video - What Caused the Giant Piper Alpha Oil Rig Explosion?


 Process Safety Video - What Caused the Giant Piper Alpha Oil Rig Explosion?

Remembering Trevor Kletz

 


Remembering Trevor Kletz, 1922-2013. This is excerpts from CSB video of Dr. Trevor Kletz, a world renowned expert in chemical process safety, who died October 31, 2013.

Information to Public

As part of the requirement in Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard) Regulation 1996 requirement, Information to Public (ITP) is required under Sub-Regulation 22 (1) and Schedule 3.

The information that need to included as part of the communication to public:

  • (a) Name of manufacturer and address of site of industrial activity.
  • (b) Identification by position held of person giving the information.
  • (c) Confirmation that the site is subject to these Regulations and that the report referred to in subregulation 15(1) has been submitted to the Director General.
  • (d) An explanation in simple terms of the activity undertaken on the site.
  • (e) The common names or the generic names of the general danger classification of the substances and preparations involved on the site which could give rise to a major accident with an indication of their principal hazardous characteristics.
  • (f) General information relating to the nature of a major accident hazard including its potential effects on the population and the environment.
  • (g) Adequate information on how the population concerned will be warned and kept informed in the event of an accident.
  • (h) Adequate information on the actions the population concerned should take and on the behaviour they should adopt in the event of an accident.
  • (i) Confirmation that the manufacturer is required to make adequate arrangements on the site, including liaison with the emergency services, to deal with accidents and to minimise their effects.
  • (j) A reference to the off-site emergency plan drawn up to cope with any off-site effects from a major accident. This shall include advice to co-operate with any instruction or request from the emergency services at the time of a major accident.
  • (k) Details of where further relevant information can be obtained subject to the requirements of confidentiality laid down in any national legislation.

PGS 1 Methods for Determining Possible Damage (Green Book)

Methods for Determining Possible Damage known as The Green Book as part of the Publication Series on Dangerous Substances (Publicatiereeks Gevaarlijke Stoffen – PGS). (Link)

This publication (also known as the 'green book') presents damage models for determining possible damage to people and goods due to the release of hazardous substances. The use of the damage models will generally be preceded by the application of so-called effect models. With the aid of damage models, the calculated effects can be converted into damage to people or goods. Together, the 'red book' (PGS 4: probabilities), the 'yellow book' (PGS 2: effects), the 'purple book' (PGS 3: Quantitative Risk Analysis) and the 'green book' (PGS 1: damage) formed the series of standard works for risk analyses.

Please note that the coloured books will in principle no longer be updated, but will remain available for the time being as a historical reference work.

The file is available in Portable Document Format (PDF) which can be read from common PDF reader.


PGS 2 Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects (Yellow Book)

Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects known as The Yellow Book as part of the Publication Series on Dangerous Substances (Publicatiereeks Gevaarlijke Stoffen – PGS). (link)

This publication (also known as the 'yellow book') presents effect models for determining possible effects due to the release of hazardous substances. Together, the 'red book' (PGS 4: chances), the 'yellow book' (PGS 2: effects), the 'purple book' (PGS 3: Quantitative Risk Analysis) and the 'green book' (PGS 1: damage) formed the series of standard works for risk analyses.

Please note that the coloured books will in principle no longer be updated, but will remain available for the time being as a historical reference work.

The file is available in Portable Document Format (PDF) which can be read from common PDF reader.

PGS 3 Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Purple Book)

The Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment known as The Purple Book as part of the Publication Series on Dangerous Substances (Publicatiereeks Gevaarlijke Stoffen – PGS). (link)

This publication (also known as the 'purple book') describes calculation methods for performing risk calculations. Together, the 'red book' (PGS 4: probabilities), the 'yellow book' (PGS 2: effects), the 'purple book' (PGS 3: Quantitative Risk Analysis) and the 'green book' (PGS 1: damage) formed the series of standard works for risk analyses.

Please note that the coloured books will in principle no longer be updated, but will remain available for the time being as a historical reference work.

The file is available in Portable Document Format (PDF) which can be read from common PDF reader.

PGS 4 Methods for Determining and Processing Probabilities (Red Book)

Methods for Determining and Processing Probabilities known as The Red Book as part of the Publication Series on Dangerous Substances (Publicatiereeks Gevaarlijke Stoffen – PGS). (link)

This publication (also known as the 'red book') describes methods for determining accident scenarios with associated probabilities and how to deal with them (statistics). Together, the 'red book' (PGS 4: probabilities), the 'yellow book' (PGS 2: effects), the 'purple book' (PGS 3: Quantitative Risk Analysis) and the 'green book' (PGS 1: damage) formed the series of standard works for risk analyses.

Please note that the coloured books will in principle no longer be updated, but will remain available for the time being as a historical reference work.

The file is available in Portable Document Format (PDF) which can be read from common PDF reader.